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1. Axiomatic Method 
The axiomatic method is realized, also in the mereological case, by 
specifying an axiomatic system S, consisting of the axioms of S and the 
logic of S. The axioms of S are certain basic statements, and the logic of 
S is a set of basic inference-rules which can be used to generate further 
statements from given statements (ultimately from the axioms). The 
specification of S must be effective, that is, it must be in every case 
decidable whether or not a given statement belongs to the axioms of S, 
and whether or not a given inference-rule belongs to the logic of S. 
Relative to the axiomatic system S — the axioms plus the logic — a 
notion of provability is recursively defined: (1) the axioms of S are 
provable in S; (2) if the premise(s) of an inference-rule of the logic of S 
are provable in S, then also the conclusion of that inference-rule is 
provable in S; (3) Only statements that can be obtained by (1) and (2) are 
provable in S. Those statements that are provable in S and that are not 
axioms of S are the theorems of S. 
Normally, the syntax of a language used in an axiomatic system 
allows only such well-formed statements as are finite-length strings of 
discrete signs; and normally, the inference-rules of an axiomatic system 
have only finitely many premises. Normally, the inference-rules of an 
axiomatic system are validity-preserving, that is, if their premises are 
valid, then their conclusion must be valid, too; and normally, the axioms 
of an axiomatic system are valid statements. Normally, validity entails 
truth. Normally, the axioms and basic inference-rules of an axiomatic 
system are easily describable (though it may consist of infinitely many 
axioms and basic inference-rules), and their description will fit on a few 
printed pages, perhaps on only one page, perhaps on just a few lines. If 
an axiomatic system is normal in the sense of displaying all six of the 
aspects of normality just specified, then that system fulfils the purpose 
of describing validly (hence truthfully), rigorously, and compendiously a 
certain region of being. 
A normal axiomatic system S is complete with regard to validity in the 
language of S if all the valid statements in that language are provable in 
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S. A normal axiomatic system S is minimal if it has no proper part S´ 
which is such that the very same statements are provable in S´ that are 
provable in S. Completeness and minimality are more or less aesthetic 
virtues in a normal axiomatic system (and completeness, in fact, a virtue 
that is realizable only within very narrow confines). 
Regarding the interpretation of a normal axiomatic system S, there is a 
fundamental alternative: either the language of S is completely inter-
preted, or it is not. The interesting case is the latter. In this latter case, S 
may be taken to enumerate valid (hence true) statements; but it is not 
entirely determined about what they are valid statements. The only thing 
(provisionally) determined is that the statements of S (its axioms and 
theorems) are to be understood in such a way as to be valid (hence true); 
but usually there are various ways known of understanding them thus. 
Moreover, if the language of S is not completely interpreted, then altern-
ative (though in certain respects similar) interpretations of it may sug-
gest themselves, and accordingly also a multitude of axiomatic systems 
that are alternatives to S — even systems S´ that allow the proof of 
statements of which the negations are provable in S. Nevertheless, both 
S and S´ can each be a normal axiomatic system. Therefore, S can be 
taken to enumerate valid statements, and S´ can also be taken to enu-
merate valid statements. This is made possible by the fact that the lan-
guage of S — which is also the language of S´ — is incompletely inter-
preted: that language — in its given state of interpretation — allows that 
all the statements of S be valid (which means: there is a completion of 
the language’s incomplete interpretation according to which all the state-
ments of S are valid), but also allows that all the statements of S´ be 
valid (which means: there is another completion of that interpretation 
according to which all the statements of S´ are valid). 
For illustration, consider the mereological case. We have a language L 
of first-order predicate logic with identity, and in that language a special 
predicate, P(x, y), to be read as: “x is a part of y”. An axiomatic mereo-
logical system with respect to L is an axiomatic system, formulated in L, 
in whose axioms the predicate P(x, y) is the most prominent predicate. 
Consider the following three axiomatic mereological systems with 
respect to L, of which in each case only the first three axioms are stated: 
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MS1 
The logic of MS1: first-order predicate logic with identity. 
The axioms of MS1: 
∀x∀y∀z(P(x, y) ∧ P(y, z) ⊃ P(x, z)), 
∀xP(x, x), 
∀x∀y(P(x, y) ∧ P(y, x) ⊃ x  = y), etc. 
 
MS2 
The logic of MS2: the logic of MS1. 
The axioms of MS2: 
∀x∀y∀z(P(x, y) ∧ P(y, z) ⊃ P(x, z)), 
∀x∀y[P(x, y) ⊃ ∃z(P(z, y) ∧ z ≠ x ∧ ¬∃u(P(u, x) ∧ P(u, z)))], 
∀y∃xP(x, y), etc. 
 
MS3 
The logic of MS3: the logic of MS2. 
The axioms of MS3: 
∀x∀y∀z(P(x, y) ∧ P(y, z) ⊃ P(x, z)), 
∀x∀y(P(x, y) ⊃ ¬P(y, x)), 
∃y∀x¬P(x, y), etc. 
 
These three systems are pairwise contradictory to each other, in the 
sense that, for each pair, a statement is provable in one member of the 
pair of which the negation is provable in the other. Yet, each can be a 
normal axiomatic mereological system with respect to L, depending on 
how the interpretation of L is completed. If the universe of discourse of 
L comprises precisely the subsets of the set of human beings, and P(x, y) 
means as much as “x is a proper or improper subset of y,” then the three 
stated axioms of MS1 are valid. If, however, the universe of discourse of 
L comprises precisely the volumes of space, and P(x, y) means as much 
as “x is a proper sub-volume of y,” then the three stated axioms of MS2 
are valid. If, finally, the universe of discourse of L comprises precisely 
the natural numbers and P(x, y) means as much as “x is a proper sub-
number of y,” then the three stated axioms of MS3 are valid. 
 
 
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Augsburg
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 17.02.20 11:56
 442 
2. Abstract(a) 
All abstract individuals have neither spatial nor temporal parts, or in 
other words: they have neither a spatial nor a temporal localization in a 
literal — non-analogical — sense. Perhaps all individuals that have 
neither spatial nor temporal parts are abstract, perhaps not: God, angels, 
and souls would be individuals that have neither spatial nor temporal 
parts, yet one would not call any one of them “abstract”. 
Not only certain individuals but also certain non-individuals are 
abstract. In fact, there is a longstanding tendency in ontology to consider 
all non-individuals to be abstract entities, the rationale for this being that 
all non-individuals have neither spatial nor temporal parts (in a literal 
sense). But, as in the case of individuals, so also in the case of non-
individuals (for example, universals and states of affairs): the absence of 
spatial and temporal parts does not appear to be a sufficient condition for 
abstractness (though it is a necessary condition in both cases). It just 
does not seem appropriate to call, say, the state of affairs of the earth’s 
revolving around the sun an abstract entity. 
It has been suggested that what makes an entity abstract is its lack of 
causal powers. But the absence of causal powers, too, is no sufficient 
condition for abstractness (although it is a necessary condition for it), 
because not all causal epiphenomena are bound to be abstract. If some 
conscious experiences had no causal powers, it would certainly not make 
them abstract. Nor would I be abstract if I — in contrast to my brain — 
had no causal powers. 
Whatever may be the precise meaning of abstractness, propositions 
and concepts belong to ontological categories that, with great plausib-
ility, are abstract throughout: very plausibly, all propositions and all 
concepts are abstract. This implies that propositions and concepts have 
neither spatial nor temporal parts. Their lack of spatial and temporal 
parts, however, does not prevent propositions and concepts from having, 
and being, parts in some sense, and hence it does not prevent them from 
having their own abstract mereologies. 
The mereology of propositions can be built on the notion of logical 
part, where proposition p is a logical part of proposition q if, and only if, 
q logically entails p. The intended logical entailment is logical entail-
ment broadly conceived; it is not logical entailment as codified in some 
logical system, say, first-order predicate logic (but logical entailment 
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broadly conceived does of course extensionally comprise the entailment 
relation of first-order predicate logic: every instance of the latter relation 
is also an instance of the former). 
The mereology of concepts can be built on top of the mereology of 
propositions by making use of the following definition, which extends 
the notion of logical part from propositions to concepts: 
The concept F is a logical part of the concept G if, and only if, (1) F 
and G are meaningful for exactly the same entities, and (2), for all x 
for which F is meaningful, the proposition that F applies to x is a 
logical part of the proposition that G applies to x. 
Thus, for example, the concept of extendedness is a logical part of the 
concept of colouredness, because (1) both concepts are meaningful for 
exactly the same entities and because (2) for all x for which extended-
ness is meaningful: the proposition that extendedness applies to x is a 
logical part of the proposition that colouredness applies to x. 
A mereology with primitive part-relation (and not with some other 
mereological relation as primitive, as for example the relation of over-
lap) is either a proper-parts or a proper-or-improper-parts mereology, 
depending on how the basic part-relation is conceived of. Clearly, the 
mereology of propositions, as based on the notion of logical part, under-
stood in the sense specified above, is a proper-or-improper-parts mereo-
logy. For the part-relation of that mereology, transitivity and reflexivity 
hold (for all entities in its field, that is: for all propositions) — this is no 
news compared to other proper-or-improper-parts mereologies. But an 
abstract mereology — for example, the mereology of propositions — 
differs significantly from a usual proper-or-improper-parts mereology. 
In contrast to a usual mereology of this kind, the principle of mereo-
logical extensionality — according to which entities that are parts of 
each other are identical to each other — fails to hold in the case of the 
mereology of propositions: Even though the proposition that Jack is 
older than Mack and the proposition that Mack is younger than Jack are 
logical parts of each other, the two propositions are two propositions, 
and not one and the same. Moreover, it is not a usual feature of mereo-
logies that, according to them, some entity that belongs to the field of 
their part-relation is a part of every entity that belongs to that field. For 
example, there certainly is no volume of space which is a sub-volume of 
every volume of space. In contrast, there are many — indeed, infinitely 
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many — propositions which are a logical part of every proposition: the 
proposition that 1 = 1, the proposition that what is not extended is not 
coloured, the proposition that not every proposition is false, etc. 
Especially the feature of the mereology of propositions that has just 
been described may suggest to some that the so-called mereology of 
propositions is not really — but only analogically — a mereology. Yet, 
one may well ask: what is an intuitively satisfactory criterion according 
to which one is to decide whether a theory is really (literally, genuinely) 
a mereology or not? Here is such a criterion: 
A mereology-like theory is a genuine mereology if, and only if, its 
part-relation satisfies the following schema: For all x and y: x is a part 
of y only if the conjunction (or sum) of x and y is identical to y. 
And, as a matter of fact, we find that the part-relation of the mereology 
of propositions does not appear to satisfy that schema: The proposition 
that Mack is male is a logical part of the proposition that Mack is the son 
of Jack. But it does not seem to be the case that the conjunction of the 
two propositions is identical to the proposition that Mack is the son of 
Jack: the proposition that Mack is male and the son of Jack seems to be 
obviously different from the proposition that Mack is the son of Jack. 
Hence one is quite justified in concluding that the mereology of 
propositions is not a genuine mereology, but a mereology only in an ana-
logical sense. However, the situation changes fundamentally if proposi-
tions — quite disregarding the plausibility of their uniform abstractness 
— are identified with coarse-grained states of affairs, which to some 
thinkers has not seemed a totally inadequate thing to do. 
3. Universals 
Universals belong to those entities that have neither spatial nor temporal 
parts, and therefore have neither a (literal) spatial nor a (literal) temporal 
localization. Universals are either non-predicative or predicative. The 
non-predicative universals are also called types or type-objects (for 
example, the letter A). The predicative universals, in turn, are divided 
into the properties and the relations. Types are closely related to prop-
erties: there is a property p(T) corresponding one-to-one to each type T, 
such that x exemplifies/instantiates T if, and only if, x exem-
plifies/instantiates p(T). 
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Augsburg
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 17.02.20 11:56
 445 
Predicative universals should be distinguished from concepts, just as 
states of affairs should be distinguished from propositions. But just as 
there is a certain analogy between states of affairs and propositions, so 
there is also a certain analogy between predicative universals and con-
cept. In particular, there is an analogy between properties and monadic 
concepts, and an analogy between relations and polyadic concepts. The 
analogy is of such a strong kind that names for properties can also be 
used as names for monadic concepts, and names for relations also as 
names for polyadic concepts. Thus, “love” can both function as a name 
for a certain dyadic relation, and as a name for a certain dyadic concept. 
In those cases where the context does not already make it clear what is 
being referred to, the name can easily be disambiguated: “the relation of 
love,” “the concept of love.” The situation is entirely the same in the 
case of states of affairs and propositions: “that the moon revolves around 
the earth” can function both as a name for a state of affairs, and as a 
name for a proposition; putting “the state of affairs” or “the proposition” 
to the left of the “that”-phrase will make it clear, if need be, what is 
being referred to. 
Moreover, predicative universals and states of affairs belong together 
in a way that is analogous to the way in which concepts and propositions 
belong together. What is that way? Concepts are prominent constituents 
in the composition of propositions. Analogously, a predicative universal 
U together with the right number N of ordered entities X1, …, XN, each 
of which is — in its place — of the right kind, constitute a state of 
affairs: the state of affairs which is the composition of U with X1, …, 
XN, in short: [U, X1, …, XN]. The just-mentioned rightness for com-
position is dictated by the so-called type of U, by its composition-profile, 
so to speak; if that composition-profile is not respected, the composition-
result will not be a state of affairs. For example, [Younger, Mack, Jack] 
— the composition of the dyadic relation Younger with, first, the human 
individual Mack, and, second, the human individual Jack — is a state of 
affairs because it respects the type of Younger; it is the state of affairs 
that Mack is younger than Jack. But neither [Younger, Mack] nor 
[Younger, Mack, Younger] are states of affairs, because they do not 
respect the type of Younger. 
A predicative universal U is exemplified by the entities X1, …, XN (in 
the given order) if, and only if, [U, X1, …, XN] is an obtaining state of 
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affairs (a fact). Sometimes instantiation is distinguished from exem-
plification, such that an apple, for example, is taken to exemplify, but 
not to instantiate, the property of being red, whereas a red-trope, found 
on that apple, is indeed taken to instantiate that property. It seems best to 
treat instantiation as a species of exemplification: instantiation is exem-
plification by individuals which are not substances (that is, by entities 
that are so-called individual accidents). 
Though universals have neither spatial nor temporal parts, this does 
not prevent them from having, and being, parts in some sense. In a 
sense, a universal is a part of all the state of affairs it helps to compose. 
But since universals and states of affairs differ in ontological category, it 
seems rather more appropriate to say that a universal is a constituent of 
all the states of affairs it helps to compose than that it is a part of them. 
Part-relations between homocategorial entities differ vastly from part-
relations between heterocategorial entities, and there seems to be a slight 
bias — at least a slight one — in favour of regulating ontological dis-
course in such a way as to reserve the word “part” for designating only 
part-relations between homocategorial entities, while the word “con-
stituent” is to serve as the more general mereological term (such that 
every part is a constituent, but not vice versa). 
In any case, there is not only a heterocategorial part-relation between 
universals and states of affairs, but also a homocategorial part-relation 
between universals of the same type. Consider the simplest case: gener-
ally defined properties of individuals, that is, monadic (predicative) uni-
versals that compose a state of affairs with each individual, but with no 
non-individual. Let P and P´ be two such properties; then P is an inten-
sional part of P´ if, and only if, for all individuals X, (the state of affairs) 
[P, X] is an intensional part of (the state of affairs) [P´, X]. According to 
this, the property of being extended is an intensional part of the property 
of being coloured. Or consider a slightly more complex case: generally 
defined dyadic relations between individuals, that is, dyadic (predict-
ative) universals that compose a state of affairs with each ordered pair of 
individuals, but with no ordered pair that has a non-individual as one of 
its component. Let R and R´ be two such relations; then R is an inten-
sional part of R´ if, and only if, for all individuals X and Y, (the state of 
affairs) [R, X, Y] is an intensional part of (the state of affairs) [R´, X, 
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Y]. According to this, the relation Living-earlier-than is an intensional 
part of the relation Being-a-progenitor-of. 
The above examples are instances of a general principle, stating the 
general reducibility of intensional parthood for universals to intensional 
parthood for states of affairs: Universal U is an intensional part of 
universal U´ if, and only if, U and U´ compose states of affairs with the 
very same sequences of entities and, for every sequence Q of entities 
with which U composes a state of affairs, it is true that the state of 
affairs U composes with Q is an intensional part of the state of affairs 
that U´ composes with Q. Clearly, according to this, the principles of the 
intensional mereology of universals will be consequences of the prin-
ciples of the intensional mereology of states of affairs. 
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